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Abstract
We investigate the stability of individual behavior in a repeated public good
experiment over time by reinviting subjects back to the lab up to four times
in one week intervals. We exclude effects due to learning about others’ behav-
ior and reputation building by employing a non-learning and non-reputation
environment: subjects are neither told nor paid their earnings until the very
end of their participation and thus deprived of any feedback information and
strategic possibilities to signal their intentions. This experimental design
thus leaves unstable preferences as the most likely source for unstable behav-
ior. We observe that, in the first wave of the experiment, subjects contribute
to the public good in accordance to other-regarding preferences, but become
more selfish in the latter waves of the experiment and consequently contri-
butions to the public good decrease over time. The decline is mainly caused
by initially conditional cooperators who turn into free riders over the course
of the experiment.
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1. Introduction
The rational choice model used to describe individual decisions in mod-
ern economic theory does not explicitly assume that preferences are stable
over time. However, using comparative statics in economics makes stable
preferences a necessary implicit assumption, since only under this condition
can comparisons between different equilibria claim validity. This holds for
selfish preferences as well as for those theories which assume some kind of
other-regarding behavior expressed by social preferences.1
Although the assumption of stable preferences is crucial for large parts
of economic theory, it has seldomly been scrutinized in the literature. Yet
even in the the early days of modern economic theory Pareto apparently had
some doubts about it. According to Bruni and Sugden (2007), Pareto ac-
cepted the assumption of well-defined stable preferences only in situations, in
which a person has the opportunity to gain some experience of the decision
being made.2 Such concerns about the stability of preferences were, how-
ever, quickly brushed aside in the literature and only revived again by von
Weizsa¨cker (1971), who characterized endogenously changing preferences.
More recently, Andersen et al. (2008) and Zeisberger et al. (forthcoming)
look at the stability of risk preferences and Meier and Sprenger (2010) inves-
tigate the stability of time preferences.
The motivation for this study arises from two seemingly contradictory
recent experimental findings by Brosig et al. (2011) and Volk et al. (forth-
coming) on the stability of other-regarding preferences in dictator games and
public good games respectively. In both studies subjects repeat the basic
decision three times with a substantial amount of time passing by between
each repetition or wave (one month intervals in the case of the repeated dic-
tator games and 2.5 months in the case of the repeated public good games).
Brosig et al. (2011) report a strong dynamic towards more selfishness in
the latter waves of their experiment as less money is given to the recipient,
while Volk et al. (forthcoming) find stable aggregate behavior. If anything,
1Other-regarding preferences include altruism (see, e.g., Becker 1974, Andreoni and
Miller 2002), warm glow (see, e.g., Andreoni 1989, Andreoni 1990), inequality aversion
(see, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness and Rabin 2002),
and reciprocity (see, e.g., Sugden 1984, Falk and Fischbacher 2006).
2Plott 1996 later developed his quite similar idea of discovered preferences, e.g. people
not knowing their own preferences in unfamiliar decision situations before learning them
through experience.
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a slight, though statistically insignificant, increase in the amount of money
contributed to the public good is observed, thus pro-social behavior does not
seem to erode in their experiment.
However, since important differences in the characteristics of the respec-
tive games are not perfectly incorporated by the experimental designs em-
ployed, the studies do not allow for direct comparisons or conclusions on the
stability of other-regarding preferences. Most importantly, there is a strategic
element to public good games (see, e.g., Andreoni 1988) that dictator games
do not possess. It is argued that, if a public good game is played repeatedly
and feedback is given to subjects, it could be rational for the players to sig-
nal a high willingness to cooperate (reputation building) in order to induce
a high level of cooperation in the whole group, even though they actually
have a strong preference for free riding. If that was indeed the case, giving
feedback and paying subjects after each repetition as done by Volk et al.
(forthcoming), is likely to trigger cooperative behavior.
In this study we also conduct a series of repeated public good experiments,
but employ a non-learning and non-reputation environment by neither paying
our subjects nor giving any kind of feedback until the end of the experiment.
We elicit our subjects preferences on cooperation four times in one week
intervals by using a variant of the strategy method (Selten 1978) introduced
to public good games by Fischbacher et al. (2001). We find the same dynamic
as reported by Brosig et al. (2011) in dictator games: pro-social behavior
declines significantly over time, as roughly one third of initially conditional
cooperators turn into free riders and the amount of money contributed to
the public good decreases.
2. Experimental Design and Procedures
In this study we conduct a series of four identical standard linear one
shot public good experiments at one week intervals (waves). In each wave
subjects are pooled into groups of four and endowed with 10.00 EUR, which
they could either keep for themselves or contribute to the public good. The
payoff function of subject i is given by
πi = 10− xi + 0.4
4∑
j=1
xi (1)
where xi denotes the amount of money contributed to the public good.
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Given this payoff function it is a dominant strategy for a payoff maximizing
individual not to invest into the public good, while efficiency requires that
the entire endowment is contributed to the public good.
We employ a variant of the strategy method (Selten 1978) introduced to
public good games by Fischbacher et al. (2001) to elicit our subjects’ pref-
erences in each wave. The mechanism consists of two tasks. In the first
task, which we will refer to as the unconditional contribution, we simply ask
our subjects to indicate how much money from their initial endowment they
wish to contribute to the public good. In the second task, the conditional
contribution scheme, each subject is asked to indicate how much money he
or she wishes to contribute, conditional on what the other group members
have contributed on average (rounded to integers). To calculate the sum of
contributions to the public good, we take the unconditional contributions of
three group members and the conditional contribution scheme of the fourth
group member, whose contribution is based on the average of the other three
group members’ unconditional contributions. Picking the forth group mem-
ber randomly ensures that the mechanism is incentive compatible. Applying
the strategy method is essential, because the subjects’ direct response in the
unconditional contribution task is influenced by both preferences and beliefs
about what others might contribute. For example, a perfectly conditional
cooperator always wishes to match the average contribution made by the
other group members, so his response to the unconditional contribution task
directly reflects his belief about what the others will contribute. A decline
in contributions can therefore be explained solely by changing beliefs rather
than changing preferences, whereas the conditional contribution scheme task
eliminates the role of beliefs and thus gives us a clear picture of a subject’s
preferences and preferences only.
Before the start of each experiment, subjects are given written instruc-
tions in which both the basic public good decision situation and the incentive
compatible strategy method mechanism are explained in detail. In addition,
each subject is asked to answer a number of control questions regarding the
characteristics of our experiment see, which only starts after all subjects have
answered all control questions correctly. Thus we have strong confidence that
our participants perceived and understood our experiment correctly.
Eliciting our subjects’ preferences in each wave will only allow for valid
comparisons of preferences, if subjects perceived every repetition of the ex-
periment as completely identical, faced an identical decision situation every
time, and are in the same state of knowledge in every wave. This raises a
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number of issues the experimental design has to address. Most importantly,
subjects must not be given an incentive to conceal their true preferences
strategically in order to trigger high cooperation levels, thus learning about
the other participants’ behavior needs to be excluded. Therefore subjects
are neither told nor paid their earnings until the end of their participation
and hence no feedback information is available which otherwise could have
served as a means to manipulate.
Subjects also remain anonymous throughout the entire experiment as
each participant enters and leaves the laboratory on his own and gets seated
in a sound-proof single cabin. The group compositions are designed such that
no subject interacts with another subject more than once over the course of
the entire experiment.
Adding uncertainty about being able to take part in the next wave is
another feature of our design that ensures that subjects receive every repeti-
tion of our experiment as identical. It also excludes possible portfolio effects
arising from a subjects’ certain knowledge of taking part in the experiment
a fixed number of times. Before the start of each wave our subjects are in-
formed that the probability of taking part in the next wave was 50 %3, with
immediate payment carried out only to those, who drop out of the experi-
ment at the end of a wave. An additional benefit of this design is that it
ensures that incentives for people acting on the principle of Andreoni’s warm
glow are kept up. If no beneficiary noticed their generosity - because all re-
sults and payoffs were only revealed only towards the end of the experiment
- these incentives might have been compromised otherwise.
In order to avoid endowment effects we employ a randomized payment
mechanism. Subjects are only paid their earnings of one randomly picked
wave multiplied with the number of waves they participated in. In the first
wave 192 subjects participated. The experiment was conducted using z-Tree
(Fischbacher 2007).
3As a protection against no-shows we randomly invited 62.5 % of all participants to
the next wave but only 80 % of them would take part in the actual experiment (hence the
probability of taking part was 50 %). The other 20 % provided cover for no-shows and
were sent home with their payoff resulting from the former waves plus a 5.00 EUR show
up fee if enough other people showed up. No show up fee was paid to subjects, who took
part in the actual experiment.
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3. Results
Over the course of the experiment we observe a decline in pro-social be-
havior as measured by both the unconditional and conditional contribution
to the public good.
As mentioned before, our subjects’ response to the unconditional contri-
bution is likely influenced by both preferences and beliefs. However, since
our experimental design deprives the subjects of any feedback information
and thus does not give them an opportunity to update their beliefs, we feel
it is worthwhile reporting our data on the unconditional contribution as well
as the data obtained by the conditional contribution scheme.
We intended to put subjects into an identical decision situation in each
repetition of the experiment, which includes the uncertainty of taking part
in the next wave. Since our subjects knew that the whole experiment would
not last longer than four weeks, we can only claim to have set up identical
decision situations for the first three waves. Therefore and for the purpose
of having more independent observations in our data samples we report our
data both after three waves (N = 48) and four waves (N = 24).
Figure 1: Average Unconditional Contributions
Figure 1 illustrates the decline in the average unconditional contributions
over three and four waves respectively. The decline is statistically significant
in both cases at the 1 % level.4
4Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests Wave 1 vs. Wave 3 and Wave 1 vs. Wave 4
respectively.
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Figure 2: Average Conditional Contributions
Figure 2 represents the average conditional contributions over three (four)
waves for each of the eleven individual decisions made by the 24 (48) subjects
in the second task of our experiment. On average people are imperfect con-
ditional cooperators as contributions increase fairly linerarly in the others’
average contributions but lie below the 45 degree line which would indicate
perfectly conditional cooperation. Notably though the level of conditional
contributions to the public good declines monotonically over the course of
our experiment. The decline is statistically significant for most of the eleven
contribution decisions based on the others’ average contributions. Only at
the extremes do we not observe statistically significant differences in behav-
ior(see Table 1).
Next we aim to identify which individual behavorial patterns are respon-
sible for the decline in pro-social behavior we observe on the aggregate level.
In a first step, we classify each subject in each wave into five different types,
based on their behavior:
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Table 1: Significance Levels for Conditional Contributions
Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
W1 vs. W3 (N=48) .938 .170 .020 .032 .053 .071 .061 .072 .123 .244 .490
W1 vs. W4 (N=24) 1.000 .057 .041 .031 .036 .033 .032 .021 .079 .053 .137
Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
1. Free riders contribute at most two EUR in any of the eleven decisions
of the conditional contribution scheme or zero in all but one decision.
2. The contributions of conditional cooperators increase in the other’s av-
erage contribution.
3. Triangle cooperators initially increase contributions to some point and
decrease them afterwards
4. Unconditional cooperators always contribute their entire endowment
5. Others
Table 2: Classification of Subjects
After three waves After four waves
N Share N Share
1. Free riders 42 29.17 % 28 29.17 %
2. Conditional cooperators 80 50.56 % 52 54.17 %
3. Triangle cooperators 9 6.25 % 8 8.33 %
4. Unconditional cooperators 3 2.08 % 4 4.17 %
5. Others 10 6.94 % 4 4.17 %
144 100.00 % 96 100.00 %
Note: In each wave each subject is classified. Only those subjects who
took part in all three (four) waves are included. Therefore we have
144 (48x3) observations after three waves and 96 (24x4) observations
after four waves.
Table 2 shows the distribution of types in our experiment. Based on this
classification we devide our samples into four subgroups:
1. Free rider in every wave
2. Conditional cooperator who becomes free rider
3. Conditional cooperator in every wave
4. Others
Table 3 shows the number of subjects in each subgroup after three and
four waves respectively. The decline in average contributions in the whole
sample caused by conditional cooperators who become free riders (subgroup
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Table 3: Subgroups Based on Type Classification
After three waves After four waves
1. Free rider in every wave 9 3
2. Conditional cooperator who becomes free rider 7 5
3. Conditional cooperator in every wave 20 9
4. Others 12 7
2) is very apparent (see Figure 3). Individual contributions in this sub-
group do not decline abruptly but gradually (see Appendix A for full data
on subgroup 2) and subjects seem to follow a well-behaved behavioral pat-
tern right from the beginning of the experiment. Thus it is unlikely that
subjects turned into free rider as a result of learning the incentives of the
public good game in between two repetitions after having misperceived them
before. By the end of the experiment’s third (forth) wave, 7 out of 27 (5 out
of 14) conditional cooperators have turned into free riders, so roughly 30 %
of those subjects responsible for the best part of initial cooperation in the
sample stop cooperating at one point.
Figure 3: Average Conditional Contributions in Subgroup 2
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Conditional cooperators in every wave (subgroup 3) only slightly decrease
their contributions over time (Figure 4). The decline in cooperation as mea-
sured by a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test comparing the first and
third (forth) waves is statistically insignificant (see Table 4). Independent
one-sample t-tests, however, reveal that the means for several of the de-
cisions made in the conditional contribution task significantly differ from
expected means under the assumption of perfect conditional cooperation in
waves three and four, whereas they do not in the respective first waves (see
also Table 4). Testing perfect conditional cooperation thus makes a slight
decline in contributions by conditional cooperators statistically visible.
Figure 4: Average Conditional Contributions in Subgroup 3
As some subjects in subgroup 4 decide rather randomly on conditional
contributions in the first wave and then adapt a well-behaved systematic
pattern in the latter waves, contributions by chance slightly increase within
subgroup 4 over time (see Appendix B for the complete individual data on
members of subgroup 4). Thus the magnitude of the decline in cooperation
in our sample is probably underestimated in our previous statistical analysis.
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Table 4: Significance Levels for Subgroup 3
Average contribution of other group members
μ0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
W1 vs. W31 1.000 1.000 .383 .672 .281 .188 .375 .238 .375 .469 .625
W1 vs. W41 1.000 1.000 .500 .375 .250 .250 .500 .375 .875 1.000 1.000
t-test W12 .330 .202 .086 .064 .144 .135 .181 .379 .154 .116 .009
t-test W32 .330 .001 .001 .005 .007 .013 .018 .052 .087 .048 .006
t-test W12 .695 .482 .512 .860 .877 1.000 .855 .655 .438 .065
t-test W42 .013 .017 .023 .057 .065 .049 .163 .438 .397 .095
1 Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
2 H0 : x = μ0
When subjects in subgroup 4 are removed from the sample, the dynamic
towards more selfishness becomes even more evident (see Table 5, Figure 5).
Figure 5: Average Conditional Contributions Without Subgroup 4
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Table 5: Significance Levels for Conditional Contributions Without Subgroup 4
Average contribution of other group members
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
W1 vs. W3 (N=36) 1.000 .138 .017 .041 .014 .004 .005 .004 .006 .008 .043
W1 vs. W4 (N=17) 1.000 .359 .055 .031 .023 .023 .021 .016 .035 .035 .063
Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests
4. Discussion & Conclusion
We conducted a series of four repeated standard linear one shot pub-
lic good games in one week intervals and employed an experimental design
suited to the task of eliciting our subject’s cooperation preferences by ex-
cluding effects due to learning and reputation building. We find a significant
decline in pro-social behavior, which is mainly caused by roughly one third
of initially conditional cooperators who turn into free riders over the course
of the experiment. Our data supports previous evidence reported by Brosig
et al. (2011), who conducted repeated dictator games and found a dynamic
towards more selfish behavior in the latter waves of their experiment.
Our results, however, are in contrast to the stable aggregate behavior ob-
served by Volk et al. (forthcoming) in their repeated public good experiments.
Since in their experiment feedback was given after each repetition, and hence
effects due to learning and reputation building cannot be ruled out, method-
ological differences in the experimental setup could possibly explain these
seemingly contradictory findings. A second reason for these differences could
be the substantial difference in the amount of time in-between two waves in
their experiment and ours. Possibly pro-social behavior first erodes and then
regenerates over time. The fact that older people are not less pro-social than
younger people supports this hypothesis.
A possible explanation for the decline of pro-social behavior could be the
human tendency to adaption. As neurosciences tell us, the reward system of
the brain adapts rather quickly. Tobler et al. (2005) show that the human
brain’s reward system lowers its production of dopamine in response to a
positively evaluated stimulus if that stimulus is given repeatedly. In the
context of our study, contributing to the public good might be a stimulus
that causes a warm glow or another kind of positive feeling, which declines
if that stimulus is triggered again in the next wave, leading the subject to
reduce his contribution to the public good.
Merritt et al. (2010) review research on a moral self-licensing effect, which
delivers another possible explanation for our findings. The effect describes
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people’s tendency to engage in ”behaviors that are immoral, unethical, or
otherwise problematic” on the back of an ”impeccable track record [which]
increaes their propensity to engage in otherwise suspect actions”. Again, in
the context of our study, contributing to the public good in an early wave
could satisfy people’s desire to comply to the underlying social norm in a
public good game, which likely includes not to free ride on fellow group
members, and afterwards licensee them to act on their own individual selfish
preferences.
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Appendix A: Individual data of subjects in subgroup 2
After three waves:
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
2 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 2 0
3 3 1 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 0 3 3 0
4 4 1 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 4 1 0 5 4 0
5 5 2 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 5 2 0 5 5 0
6 5 2 0 7 0 0 6 10 0 2 2 2 5 0 0 6 2 0 7 6 0
7 5 3 0 7 0 0 7 10 0 2 2 2 5 0 0 7 3 0 7 7 0
8 6 3 0 8 0 0 8 10 0 2 2 2 6 0 0 8 4 0 9 8 0
9 6 3 0 10 0 0 9 10 0 2 2 2 7 0 0 9 5 0 9 9 0
10 8 3 0 10 0 0 10 10 0 3 0 0 7 0 0 10 6 0 10 10 0
The first row of the table lists the seven subjects in subgroup 2 after three waves. The second row indicates
the three waves of the experiment. The first column indicates the average contribution of the other three
group members. Each of the other columns shows the conditional contribution scheme of a particular
subject in a particular wave.
After four waves:
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
3 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 4 0 0 0
4 4 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 5 0 0 0
5 5 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 2 0 0 5 0 0 0
6 6 10 0 0 2 2 2 0 5 0 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 0 0 0
7 7 10 0 0 2 2 2 0 5 0 0 0 7 3 0 0 7 0 0 0
8 8 10 0 0 2 2 2 0 6 0 0 0 8 4 0 0 8 0 0 0
9 9 10 0 0 2 2 2 0 7 0 0 0 9 5 0 0 10 0 0 0
10 10 10 0 0 3 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 10 6 0 0 10 0 0 0
The first row of the table lists the five subjects in subgroup 2 after four waves. The second row
indicates the four waves of the experiment. The first column indicates the average contribution
of the other three group members. Each of the other columns shows the conditional contribution
scheme of a particular subject in a particular wave.
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Appendix B: Individual data of subjects in subgroup 4
After three waves:
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 10 10 10
1 1 1 0 1 2 1 3 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 1 10 10 10
2 2 2 2 4 2 1 4 2 2 0 3 2 2 2 2 10 10 10
3 2 2 2 6 2 1 4 2 3 0 3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10
4 0 3 3 3 6 3 4 4 4 0 3 4 8 4 4 10 10 10
5 0 3 5 7 5 3 5 4 5 0 3 5 7 5 5 10 10 10
6 0 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 0 4 5 5 6 6 10 10 10
7 0 5 2 7 3 4 4 4 5 0 4 5 3 7 7 10 10 10
8 0 3 2 2 2 4 2 4 2 0 4 3 8 8 8 10 10 10
9 0 1 0 2 2 4 1 2 1 0 3 3 10 9 9 10 10 10
10 0 0 0 2 4 4 0 0 0 0 3 4 10 10 10 10 10 10
The first row of the table lists subjects #1 to #6 in subgroup 4 after three waves. The
second row indicates the three waves of the experiment. The first column indicates the
average contribution of the other three group members. Each of the other columns shows the
conditional contribution scheme of a particular subject in a particular wave.
#7 #8 #9 #10 #11 #12
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 7 5 0 2 0 0 2
1 2 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 2 8 8 4 1 4 1 1 2
2 2 1 1 2 0 0 3 1 3 6 9 8 3 2 3 1 1 2
3 2 1 2 3 0 0 6 2 4 5 10 7 2 4 2 2 1 2
4 2 2 2 3 0 1 3 3 5 4 7 6 1 4 4 2 1 2
5 2 2 2 3 0 1 5 4 6 8 8 9 0 5 4 3 1 2
6 2 4 4 3 1 2 5 5 6 7 7 10 10 5 5 2 1 2
7 4 4 4 4 1 3 5 5 6 0 7 7 9 6 5 2 1 2
8 4 2 4 4 1 4 5 6 7 5 8 8 8 7 8 1 1 2
9 6 2 6 4 1 5 5 7 8 3 9 8 7 8 10 1 1 2
10 2 4 6 4 1 5 10 8 9 2 8 9 6 8 10 0 1 2
The first row of the table lists subjects #7 to #12 in subgroup 4 after three waves. The
second row indicates the three waves of the experiment. The first column indicates the
average contribution of the other three group members. Each of the other columns shows
the conditional contribution scheme of a particular subject in a particular wave.
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After four waves:
#1 #2 #3 #4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 3 1 1
2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 2 1 0 0 3 2 2
3 3 0 0 1 2 2 2 3 6 2 1 1 0 3 3 3
4 3 0 1 1 0 3 3 3 3 6 3 1 0 3 4 4
5 3 0 1 1 0 3 5 2 7 5 3 2 0 3 5 5
6 3 1 2 2 0 4 4 3 4 4 3 2 0 4 5 4
7 4 1 3 3 0 5 2 3 7 3 4 2 0 4 5 4
8 4 1 4 4 0 3 2 2 2 2 4 3 0 4 3 3
9 4 1 5 5 0 1 0 0 2 2 4 3 0 3 3 3
10 4 1 5 5 0 0 0 0 2 4 4 4 0 3 4 3
The first row of the table lists subjects #1 to #4 in subgroup 4 after four
waves. The second row indicates the four waves of the experiment. The first
column indicates the average contribution of the other three group members.
Each of the other columns shows the conditional contribution scheme of a
particular subject in a particular wave.
#5 #6 #7
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 4 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 10 10 10 10 2 0 1 0
2 2 2 2 2 10 10 10 10 2 1 1 1
3 3 3 3 3 10 10 10 10 2 1 2 1
4 8 4 4 4 10 10 10 10 2 2 2 1
5 7 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 2 2 2 1
6 5 6 6 0 10 10 10 10 2 4 4 2
7 3 7 7 0 10 10 10 10 4 4 4 2
8 8 8 8 0 10 10 10 10 4 2 4 3
9 10 9 9 0 10 10 10 10 6 2 6 3
10 10 10 10 0 10 10 10 10 2 4 6 3
The first row of the table lists subjects #5 to #7 in subgroup 4
after four waves. The second row indicates the four waves of the
experiment. The first column indicates the average contribution
of the other three group members. Each of the other columns
shows the conditional contribution scheme of a particular subject
in a particular wave.
18
 
Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg
Faculty of Economics and Management
P.O. Box  4120 | 39016 Magdeburg | Germany
Tel.: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 85 84
Fax: +49 (0) 3 91 / 67-1 21 20
www.ww.uni-magdeburg.dew.f w.ovgu. e/femm
ISSN 1615-4274
